IN WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS.

and this seems right where it turns out that the boundaries are
obscure.
A latent ambiguity does not necessarily avoid an instrument,
and yet it is obvious that in many cases a latent ambiguity may
turn out as fatal to an instrument as the most hopeless case of a
patent ambiguity. The extrinsic evidence adduced to explain it
sometimes proves entirely unsatisfactory and results in leaving
the matter wholly to conjecture, in which case the instrument cannot be enforced. The learning on this subject is voluminous, but
indigested. The foregoing, gathered mainly from Cowen & Hill's
notes on Phillips's Evidence points out the several kinds of ambiguities and their effects on written instruments, and may serve a
good purpose by calling to the subject the attention of the student
of legal science.
S.. H. 0.
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Supreme Judicial Court of MIaine.
THE STATE v. THOMAS 0. GOOLD.
It is a reasonable regulation for a railroad corporation to fix rates of fare by a
tariff posted on their stations, and to allow a uniform discount on these rates to
those who purchase tickets before entering the cars.
A passenger, who has thus neglected to purchase a ticket, has no right to claim
the discount, and if he refuses to pay to the conductor the fare established by the
tariff, the conductor is justified in compelling him to leave the train at a regular
station.

Peters, Attorney- eneral, for the state.
P. Barnes, for defendant.
The respondent was indicted for assault and battery, and a verdict of guilty was rendered against him. He was a conductor on
the Grand Trunk Railway. The company had established certain
rates of fare, and had published the same by posting them on a
sheet in their different station-houses. On this sheet was a notice
that a discount of ten cents from these established rates would be
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made in favor of those passengers who should purchase tickets
before entering the cars.
The complainant entered the cars without purchasing a ticket,
and refused to pay the established rate, but insisted on the discount. The conductor removed him from the car at a regular
-station. The assault and battery charged was for this removal.
The opinion of the court was drawn up by
KENT, J.-ailroad corporations have an undoubted right to
fix and determine the rates of fare on their roads, within the limits
specified in their charters or by existing laws. They have also
an undoubted right to make reasonable regulations as to the time,
place, and mode of collfcting the same from passengers. They
may reasonably require payment before the arrival of the train at
the station where the passenger is to leave the cars. We see no
reason to question their right to require payment in advance, to
be made at a convenient office, and at convenient times; certainly,
where there is no positive interdict to entering the cars without a
ticket, as in this case. There is neither hardship nor unfairness
towards the passenger, who, ordinarily, can pay his fare and procure his ticket, without trouble or delay, at the office. But to
the company it is something more important than mere convenience that such regulations should be enforced. It is important in
simplifying accounts. It is important to promote and secure safety,
by allowing time to the conductor to attend to his proper duties
on the train, and which would be often seriously interfered with,
if his time was taken up in collecting fares and exchanging money,
and answering questions. It is highly important as a check
against mistakes or fraud on the part of conductors, and as a
guard against imposition by those seeking a passage from one
station to another without payment.
In the case at bar, no absolute rule of exclusion was established.
It appears from the statement of facts in evidence, that certain
rates of fare were established by the company-that these rates
were the regular rates, published in the tariff tables, posted in the
stations of the company. It was the rate thus established that
the passenger in this case was requested to pay. But he says
that he was not bound to pay the sum thus fixed, because by the
same rules and tariff a discount of ten cents was made from the
rates to those persons who purchased tickets at the office before
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entering the train, and that this, in fact, created two distinct and
different rates for the same passage.
If this were so, we are not prepared to decide that it would be
an unreasonable or illegal exercise of the power given to the corporation. Assuming that it is reasonable to require pre-payment
and the production of a ticket, it would seem to be simply a relaxation of the rule, in favor of the passenger, to allow him to pass
upon the payment of another rate, slightly advanced. If he neglected to avail himself of the opportunity offered to him to procure
a ticket at the lower rate, he can hardly complain that he is allowed
to proceed in the train, on payment of the rate established for
such cases, instead of being at once removed from the car.
In fact, however, in this case, but one rate was established, and
that was the sum required in the cars. This was " the established
fare," specified in our R. S., ch. 51, sec. 47. A discount of ten
cents was made on these rates, if a ticket was purchased before
entering the train. What right had this passenger to claim this
discount on the established rate ? If he knew of the regulation,
it was his carelessness or folly that led him to neglect this opportunity. If he did not know it, it was his misfortune. The company had done all that could reasonably be required of them, by
posting the regulation conspicuously in the stations of the company.
It would be an utterly impracticable rule to require that every
passenger should be personally notified of its existence before
entering the cars. Although it is not important in the view we
take, yet one cannot help asking how this particular passenger
persistently insisted on paying only "the sum required at the
ticket office," if he did not know of the rule allowing the discount
at the offices ? But if the regulation was reasonable, and reasonable notice had been given of its existence, it is not necessary to
prove actual knowledge of its existence on the part of the passenger before entering the cars. It was not a special and exceptional
but a general rule. If a passenger enters the car, without knowing anything of the rates of fare or of the rules in relation thereto, and without making any inquiries, he must be held to pay, as,
on an implied contract, according to the reasonable rates and rules
of the company. He might as well claim exemption from the
payment of anything for his passage, because he did not personally know that any rates, or what rates, were established, as to
VoL. XIV.-10
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claim exemption from the rule which makes a distinction in rates,
because he did not ascertain the fact before entering the train.
The question is to be determined on the ground of reasonableness
and power, and not on the ground of individual knowledge.
The conductor of a train is justified in compelling a passenger
who utterly refuses to pay his legal fare, to leave the car at a
regular station: R. S., ch. 51, sec. 47.
The principles before stated have been recognised and sanctioned
in Vermont, in the case of Stephen v. Smith, 29 Verm. 160, and
by the Court in New Hampshire in the case of ifilliardv. Goold,
34 N. H. 230. See also Redfield on Railways, sec. 26, Commonwealth v. Powers, 7 Met. 596.
The decision of the questions involved in this case rests upon
two general principles, well established, viz.-that it is the duty of
the corporation to adopt such regulations as are required to secure
the comfort and safety of passengers, and it is equally their right
to adopt all reasonable rules for their own security and the orderly
management of their business. The corporation is no more bound
by the one than the passenger is by the other.
The ruling of the judge was incorrect.
Exceptions sustained. New trial granted.
I. The foregoing opinion embraces a
question of considerable practical importance, and one in regard to which,
at different times, there seems to have
been considerable doubt and uncertainty
among railway managers in this country. It is probably known to our readers
that, as a general thing, upon European
railways, both in England and upon the
Continent, the passenger is required to
produce his ticket in order to gain admittance into the carriages of the train;
and the particular compartment of the
carriage, if not the particular seat, is
indicated upon the ticket. The same
rule obtained, for a time, upon some of
the railways which first went into operation here, and does, even at the present
time, to a very limited extent. But the
rule was found inconvenient in most
localities, and has been very generally
relaxed ; and passengers are, at the

present time, more commonly allowed to
enter the cars, in all portions of the
country, and to pay fare to the conductors.
This is done at considerble inconvenience to the conductors, and not a
little hazard thereby arises of neglecting other important duties. But the
most serious evil to railway management thereby induced results from it
breaking up all systematic control of the
finances of the company, by reason of
the impracticability of maintaining a
thorough check upon all receipts and
disbursements. And if that system of
exact check is thus infringed, it becomes
difficult, if not impossible, to secure the
same degree of public confidence which
would otherwise be attainable. And
there is another embarrassing resultthe want of perfect confidence and
security among the different receiving
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-,nd disbursing agents of the companywhich is almost indispensable to the
harmonious management of extensive
public works.
There can therefore be no question
of the importance of the requirement,
that fares shall be paid at the stations.
And it has always seemed to us that the
regular fares should be established, with
reference to payment, at the stations,
and should always be required to be so
paid. And if any relaxation is allowed,
for payment of fare in the cars, under
any circmbstances, it should be strictly
defined upon what grounds it will be
allowed, and an additional sum required
sufficient to compensate the company for
increased trouble and risk of loss. That
was the form in which the discrimination
was first made in such cases; but some
over-nice heads-more nice than wise,
as we regard it,-suggested that all question would be avoided by making the
regular fare the sum which should be
required in the cars, and a reduced sum
receivable at the stations. That has
very much the appearance of an evasion,
or else of fixing the regularfare as payable in the cars, when the fact, as everybody well enough understands, is that
the regularfare is that Which is receivable at the stations ; and if it had generally assumed this form, it would have
had a strong tendency to crowd out the
paying of fare in the cars, by giving it a
bad name, and causing persons to feel
that they were thereby compelled to pay
more than the regular fare. The evasion, as far as it tends to gloss over the
discrimination, to the same extent tends
to defeat its object, by inducing persons
to pay at the stations. We think, there-

fore, that the direct and manly, the
straight-forward form of making the
discrimination is the true one, so as
thereby to render the payment of fare in
the cars difficult and odious.
11. In regard to the right to make
such a discrimination, we believe there
is no ground of hesitation or doubt. In
addition to the cases already referred to
in the opinion of the learned judge, the
question is ably discussed in Crocker v.
New London, W. 6. P. Railway, 24
Conn. Rep. 249; Chicago, Quincy 4. B.
Railway v. Parks,18 Illinois Rep. 460;
St. Louis, Alton 6- Chicago Railway v.
Dalby, 19 Illinois Rep. 353.
If the company have the right to require all fares paid in adyance at the
stations before receiving tickets or entering the cars, of which there can be no
question, it would seem very obvious
that they may indemnify themselves
against loss and risk by consenting,
under special circumstances, to receive
fare in a different mode.
It has been made a question in some
cases whether the company, if they receive fares in their cars at all, should
not consent to accept the same fare
which they demand at their stations, in
all cases where the passenger is not in
fault for not obtaining a ticket in advance, the office of the company being
closed at the proper time for applying
for it: St. Louis, Alton 4- Chicago Rail.
way v. Dalby, supra, Chicago, Quincy 4B. Railway v. Parks,supra. This distinction, however, does not seem to have
been considered important in Crocker v.
New London, W. 6 P. Railway, supra.
I. F R.
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Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit, Kentucky.
JAMES R. HUGHES v. JOHN B. LITSEY et al.
A private soldier of the rebel army may rely upon the belligerent rights conceded
to the late so-called Confederacy, as a defence in a civil suit for property taken
according to the usages of war.
TIM opinion of the court was delivered by
NEWMAN, J.-The motion to strike out a portion of the answer
of the defendant in this action presents a question of importance,
upon which I have deemed it proper to give an opinion in writing.
The plaintiff, James R. Hughes, in his petition, states in substance that the defendant and a number of other persons, banded
together for the purpose of making war upon the government of
the United States, came into the county of Washington, in this
state, in July 1862, and took from the plaintiff two mules and
harness and a wagon, of the value of $450, which property of the
plaintiff, he avers, was taken by the defendant and others and
" used to haul and carry guns and ammunition belonging to said
band, and used by them in carrying out and executing their
common purpose and intent aforesaid." For the value of this
property the plaintiff prays judgment.
The defendant, R. R. Litsey, who was served with process, filed
an answer inwhich he states in substance that before and at the
commencement of the present civil war he was a citizen and
resident of the state of Texas, which state, by an ordinance of
secession, withdrew from the government of the United States,
and, with other seceding states, formed the so-called Confederate
States of America, declared their independence, and appealed to
arms in support of that declaration. He avers that at the time
of the adoption of the ordinance of secession, and ever sincR, the
state of Texas, to which he owed allegiance, has had the civil and
military power to enforce the ordinance of secession and compel
all of her citizens to obey the laws or orders of that state, and
that the Federal Government did not and could not protect him in
refusing obedience to the laws or orders of the state of Texas.
The defendant futher avers that, in pursuance of the civil and
military orders or laws of that state, he was a private soldierorganized into the army of the so-called Confederate States, and,
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together with about eight hundred others, marched by their military
officers into the state of Kentucky, and that, in the prosecution of a
public war between the so-called Confederate States and the United
States, some portion of the Confederate army to which he belonged
may have taken the property of the plaintiff, but he denies that
he himself took it or advised or aided or assisted in taking it.
The plaintiff moved the court to strike out so much of the
answer as attempts to justify or excuse the taking of the property
or exempt the defendant from liability for the acts of his associates
or fellow'soldiers.
It cannot be doubted that, as a general rule of law, all persons
who voluntarily join in an illegal undertaking are responsible for
all injuries done by any of them in carrying out the common
design, and it will be observed that the defendant in his answer
does not expressly aver that he was compelled against his will to
join the Confederate army. If he had expressly averred that be
was obliged, in order to save his life, to enter the army of the
Confederate States, and that he had joined that army and remained
with it against his will, it could not be doubted that such a defence
would be good; for surely no one who is compelled in order to
save his life to join in a mob, could justly be held responsible for
injuries done against his will by others with whom he was associated by irresistible force. But the defendant in this action predicates his defence .solely upon the rights of war, which he avers
in his answer had been conceded by the government of the United
States to the so-called Confederate States. The question now
presented for decision is whether the rights or laws of war so
apply between the two contending parties as to exempt the defendant from liability in a civil court for the injuries done to the
plaintiff by the soldiers of the so-called Confederate States, with
whom he was united and co-operating.
If the Confederate States of America had been an independent
sovereign power or government, and so recognised by the executive
and legislative departments of the Federal Government of the
United States, it could not be doubted that the defendant, as a
soldier in the army of such foreign independent government;*could
not be made liable by a civil suit for an act done by him or his
fellow-soldiers in the prosecution of a public war, if the act con
plained of was a legitimate act of war'between separate independent

HUGHES v. LITSEY ET AL.

states: Halleck on International Law, chap. xix., sec. 31, p. 848,
5 Wheaton's Rep. 152.
But the Confederate States have not been recognised by any
foreign government as an independent nation, much less so by the
government of the United States, and it cannot be doubted that,
until so recognised by the executive and legislative departments
of the government of the United States, the states claiming to
have seceded must be regarded by the judicial department of the
government, both state and national, as still constituting a part of
the United States, for it belongs exclusively to the political department of the government to recognise or refuse to recognise a new
government claiming to have displaced the old and established a
new one. Until the independence of a new state is recognised by
the executive or legislative department of the Federal Government
courts of justice and private individuals are bound to consider the
ancient state of things as remaining unaltered: Kennett v. Chambers, 14 Howard's Rep. 38 ; Iuther v. Borden, 7 Howard 1 ; 6
Wheaton's Rep. 193; 7 Id. 337; 4 Id. 52; 3 Id. 610; Lawrence's Wheaton on Int. Law 47, note 19.
It is true that many of the governments of Europe have recognised the so-called Confederate States as belligerents, and, as such,
entitled to all the rights of war against the United States as if
they were a separate and independent nation. In so doing, the
governments of Great Britain and France may have acted hastily.
but since the war has assumed such immense proportions it cannot
be doubted that they are only acting on the rule which has always
heretofore controlled the government of the United States in its
foreign relations with states unhappily engaged in civil war:
Lawrence's Wheaton on Int. Law 40, note 16. But the government of the United States has not deemed it proper, by express
declaration, to recognise the so-called Confederate States as entitled to full belligerent rights. The Federal Government might
no -doubt have done so without prejudice to its claim and ultimate
right of enforcing obedience to the Constitution and Laws of the
Union over the people and territory of the seceded states; for
" the recognition of belligerent rights in a colony or portion of a
state in revolt from or in opposition to the metropolis is not to be
confounded with the acknowledgment of the absolute independence
of such province or colony :" Lawrence's Wheaton on Int. Law,
p. 40, note 16. This recoanition, however, of belligerent rights
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in the states claiming to have seceded from the Union may be
made as -well by necessary implication as by express proclamation.
Perhaps no government has ever by express proclamation or other
formal declaration conceded full belligerent rights to those in
rebellion against its authority.
It may also, perhaps, be truthfully affirmed that no government
will concede to those in rebellion more rights than are extorted
from it by necessity, or granted to them from a sense of justice
and of honor. If, however, the political departments of the government, either from favor or by necessity, acknowledge the enemy
to be belligerents, and as such entitled to the usual rights of war,
no valid reason is perceived why the courts, which must then also
recognise the enemy as belligerents, should not apply the principles of justice, which flow from the relation of the parties to each
other thus authoritatively acknowledged ; for it is to be remembered
that in the question of belligerent rights, as of a more formal
acknowledgment of independence, the decision is with the government and not with the courts: Nueva Anna and Liebrie, 6
Wheaton's Rep. 193.
Those principles of rights or justice which flow from or arise out
of the relation of the contending parties toward each other as
recognised by the political departments of the government, must
be presumed to be also recognised and conceded, unless the contrary be expressly declared by the proper authority.
In the present -war the executive and legislative departments
of the Federal Government have claimed the constitutional right
in suppressing the rebellion to exercise belligerent as well as sovereign rights over the people of the seceded states, .and the executive, who is charged with the execution of the laws, may, no
doubt, see that the civil laws are executed through the civil tribunals of the government, or, at his discretion, enforce through the
army all the rights of war over the persons and property of the
public enemy as long as the rebellion continues, but no longer. The
political departments of the government may either exercise sovereign rights or belligerent rights over those in rebellion at their
:Iiscretion during the war: Bose v. Himeley, 4 Cranch 272; The
Amy Warwick, Law Rep. 498 (1862, before Judge SPRAGUE);
The Hiawatha, Amy Warwick, ft., 2 Black's Reps. 635; Lawrence's Wheaton 605, note 189, Ibid. 249-50, note. But the courts
or departments of the State and Federal Governments have no
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such discretion. They can only judge and determine the rights of
the parties by applying the law to the facts presented. That law
or rule of decision must be ascertained by reference to the con
stitutions and municipal laws of the State and Federal Governments,
and also the laws of nations and of war, for the laws of nations and
of war, when applicable to the facts, constitute the rules of decision in a civil court as fully, and are as binding as are the rules
of the common law. Respublica v. D e Iongehamps, 1 Dallas 117 ;
?epubllca v. Sparhawk, Id. 362 ; Wade v. Barnwell, 2 Bay's
S. C. Rep. 231; Wilcocks & als. v. Union Ins. Co., 2 Binney
581. No clause of the State or Federal Constitutions, nor any act
of Congress, it is believed, has any direct reference to the question presented in this case.
The statute of the Legislature of Kentucky entitled "An act to
provide a civil remedy for injuries done by disloyal persons," approved February 22, 1864, was not passed until long after the
doing of the injuries complained of in this action. The previous
statute, entitled "An act to amend the code of practice in civil
cases," approved December 23, 1861, if intended to authorize proceedings against those disloyal persons who commit trespasses upon
the property of citizens in this state, does not in terms apply to
such persons as are non-residents or citizens of any of the seceded
states. To what extent the Legislature of Kentucky may modify
the laws of war in their application to the citizens of another state at
war with the United States, would be an interesting question, which,
however, does not arise in this action. And as the defendant in
this action was not a citizen of Kentucky at the commencement of
this war, and was not intended to be embraced by the statute of
December, 1861, I shall not now undertake to decide as to the
extent of the liability of a citizen of Kentucky who may voluntarily
have entered into the service of the Confederate States, and afterwards committed injuries to the property of the citizens of Kentucky.
The question in this case resolves itself into the inquiry whether
the laws of war are to be applied by the courts of this state to the
existing contest between the United States and the revolutionary
power composed of seceded states, styling themselves the Confederate States of America. The answer to this inquiry depends
mainly upon the question whether the contest is to be considered
or recognised by the courts as a civil war, properly so called, or
as a mere rebellion without any of the rights of war; for if it be
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recognised by the courts as a civil war, properly so called, there
seems to be no distinction or difference between the laws or usages
of war, which should be observed in civil or in foreign wars. In
fact, it has been authoritatively declared that they are the same :
The antissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. R. 337; The Tropic Wind,
Law Rep. (July 1861) 151; The Hiawatha,Amy Warwick, &c.,
supra; Halleck's Int. Law, ch. 14, §§ 7, 8, p. 333; Lawrence's
Wheaton Int. Law, part iv., ch. 1, § 7, p. 521, note 171; Ibid.
part 1, ch. 2, §§ 7-10, pp. 39-46 ; Ibid., Supplement, p. 13; Ibid.
p. 517; Vattel B. III., ch. 18, § 294.
" The common laws of war," says Vattel, " are in civil wars
to be observed on both sides. The same reasons which make
them obligatory between foreign states render them more necessary in the unhappy circumstances where two exasperated parties
are destroying their common country." Mr. Wheaton says: " A
civil war between the different members of the same society is
what Grotius calls a mixed war; it is, according to him, pu6lic on
the side of tle established government, and private on the part of
the people resisting its authority. But the general usage of nations
regards such a war as entitling both the contending parties to all
the rights of war as against each other, and even as respects neutral
nations." Judge DuNLoP, in the case of The Tropic Wind, says:
"I do not find, on examination of the writers on public law, any
difference as to belligerent rights in civil or in foreign wars ; and
Judge STORY, in The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheaton, as here.
tofore cited by me, says they are the same." Judge GRIER, in
delivering the opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court, in
the cases of The Hiawathaand Amy Warwick, says, "1the parties to a civil war usually concede to -ach other belligerent rights."
In the same cases, Judge IELSON, in delivering the opinion of the
minority of the court, including the Chief Justice (TANEY), says:
"In the case of a rebellion, or resistance by a portion of the people of a country against the established government, there is no
doubt, if, in its progress and enlargement, the government thus
sought to be overthrown sees fit, it may, by the competent power,
recognise or declare the existence of a state of civil war, which
will draw after it all the consequences and rights of war between
the contending parties, as in the case of a public war."
But the question still recurs, whether this court must recognise
the existing contest as a civil war, properly so called, or merely
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as a tumult, sedition, or insurrection, constituting what is properly
termed a rebellion only. Writers on public law make a distinction between a tumult of the people, sedition, or insurrection, and
civil war depending in a great degree upon the amount of force
brought by the insurgents to resist the lawful government. In
dealing with a mob, tumult, or sedition of the people, which presupposes the undoubted power of the government to suppress it
without calling in the aid of regular armies, belligerent rights,
strictly so called have ordinarily no place; and all who are voluntarily engaged in such illegal proceedings will be held individually responsible for any injury done to others by any of those
engaged in carrying out the common purpose. But when the
popular commotion or insurrection by its numbers, power, and
organization brings forces into the field sufficiently powerful to
destroy the civil authority of the government, close its courts,
substitute de facto governments in its stead, and make regular
armies necessary to suppress the insurrection and restore the
authority of the legitimate government, the contest then undoubtedly becomes civil war, and the rights and responsibilities of those
engaged in it must be determined by the principles or laws of war,
as applied to nations ; and not by the rules or principles applicable
to a mob. At what time the contest has assumed the character of
civil war, and is to be recognised and treated as such, belongs to
the executive or -legislative department of the government, and
not to the courts, to decide. When those departments have
declared that civil war exists, the courts are bound by that decision, and must apply the laws of war to the facts upon which the
rights and responsibilities of individuals depend, so far as those
laws are not modified by the legislative department of the government, which may no doubt alter or modify the laws of war, in her
.own courts. This decision of the federal executive and legislative departments that civil war exists, is binding not only upon the
courts of the Federal, but of the State governments. Whether
the power to recognise or declare that civil war exists be in the
President alone or in Congress, it is certain that such a war existed
before the commission of the acts complained of in this case. The
Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of The Hiawatha
and Am
arwick, supra, agree with entire unanimity that civil
war existed between this government and the Confederate States
after the Act of Congress of the 13th July 1861.
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Another view of the facts of this case tends to strengthen the
conclusion that the rights and responsibilities of the defendant in
this action must be determined by the laws of war regulating public wars between foreign states. The defendant, before the
commencement of this war, was a citizen and resident of the state
of Texas, and owed to that state a true and faithful allegiance,
recognised by the fundamental laws of both State and Federal
Government. This allegiance to his state, it is true, was subordinate to the allegiance which he owed to the Federal Government,
which is supreme in its sphere ; but it was nevertheless an allegiance
properly owing to the state, which gave him protection for his life
and property. When the state of Texas, as a state, claiming to
be sovereign over the lives and property of its citizens, claimed
the right, by its ordinance of secession, to absolve its citizens
from all allegiance to the Federal Government, the citizen was
subjected to an embarrassing and sad conflict of duties to two
sovereigns, made the more embarrassing and difficult of choice by
the known and avowed declaration of eminent statesmen, that the
allegiance of the citizen was due primarily or directly to the
state sovereignty, and through it only to the Federal Government.
It had, however, been repeatedly adjudged, by both state and
Federal courts, that the duty of allegiance to the United States
was coextensive with the constitutional jurisdiction of that government, and to that extent independent of and paramount to any duty
of allegiance to a state government: 0olhena v. Virginia,6 Wheat.
Rep. 381 ; Moore v. The People of llinois, 14 How. 20 ; 21 How.
517 ; United States v. Greiner,Law Reporter, June 1861, p. 98 ;
Lawrence's Wheaton on International Law, Supplement, p. 12.
Notwithstanding the state of Texas had by its ordinance seceded
from the Union, it was the duty of the defendant to adhere to the
Federal Government, especially as there was no sufficient cause to
justify the revolution. But allegiance and protection are correlative terms or duties: United States v. Iice, 4 Wheaton~s Rep.
254; United States v. Hayward, 2 Gall. Rep. 500; United
States v. Greiner, supra; Lawrence's Wheaton's Int. Law 600,
note 189. And where the Federal Government, as is averred in
this case, did not, and could not, protect the defendant in refusing
to submit to the civil and military power of the state of Texas, it
surely would be unjust to exact from him the full and complete
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discharge of his allegiance and duties to the Federal Government,
and deny to him-especially in a state court-a defence based
upon those rights which the laws of nations and of war confer
upon the people of a de facto state in revolt against the established
government. It does not appear in this cse that the defendant
was one of the instigators or leaders in the rebellion-the pleadings present him as merely passive-submitting to an usurped
authority which he could not resist; and afterward assisting in
the prosecution of a public war against the government of the
United States. A temporary allegiance is due to the usurper in
possession. It has been said by high authority that when an
usurper is in possession the subject is excused and justified in
obeying and giving him assistance; otherwise under an usurpation
no man would be safe, if the lawful prince had a right to hang him
for obedience to the powers in being, as the usurper would certainly do for disobedience: 1 Hale P. C. 104 ; Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 77. Lawrence's Wheaton on International
Law, p. 525, note 171. Without intending to sanction the principle that in civil war every man has a right to choose his party;
and without intending to intimate an opinion that those who take
up arms voluntarily against the Federal Government may not be
convicted of treason, especially after the rebellion is suppressed,
if the party accused be not included in the pardon whichis usually
issued in such cases; yet it seems to me evident that, when a state
as such, has, by a public ordinance seceded from the Union, and
usurped the powers of the Federal Government, a private citizen
and resident of the state, who took no part in favor of the ordinance of secession, but submitted to the usurpation, and afterward
entered the army of the Confederate States,may, in a state court,
rely upon the belligerent rights of the de facto state, as a defence
in a civil suit for property taken according to the usages of war.
Halleck, in his Treatise on International Law, p. 334, says: " A
war may be a war of insurrection, or revolution, or independence,
and at the same time a national war ;" and he adds: " Where such
insurgent militia are called into the field, and organized under the
constituted authorities of the state, they are entitled to all the
rights of war, and are subject to all its duties and responsibilities."
Ibid. 386. See Monthly Law Reporter, June 1862, pp. 475-79.
Undoubtedly if the defendant be guilty of an act which is not
sustained or justified by the laws of civilized warfare, such as
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killing unoffending women or children, or committing other wanton
outrages to the person or property of non-combatants, or such acts
as are not justified by the usages of war, nor commanded by the
party belligerent in whose service he is, the courts would hold him
civilly or criminally responsible for his unauthorized act: Halleck
on Int. Law, ch. 19, sec. 81, p. 348.
What property on land may be taken from an enemy depends
in a great measure upon the will or policy of the belligerent party
prosecuting the war and making the seizure. It is not an immutable rule of law, but depends on political considerations, which
may continually vary: 8 Cranch 110. In the recent cases of The
Hfiawatha and Amy TFarwick, above referred to, Judge NELSON
says that, " All the property of the people of the two countries,
on land or sea, are subject to capture and confiscation by the
adverse party, as enemies' property, with certain qualifications
as it respects property on land." Temples of religion, public
edifices devoted to civil purposes only, monuments of art, repositories of science, and the private property of citizens, not necessary for military purposes, are, by the modem usage of civilized
nations, exempted from the operations of war. The general usage
now amongst civilized nations, is not to touch private property
upon land without making compensation, unless in special cases,
dictated by the necessary operations of war. If the conqueror
goes beyond these limits wantonly, or where it is not clearly indispensable to the just purposes of war, and seizes private property
of pacific persons, for the sake of gain, he yiolates the modern
usages of war. The laws of war, however, permit or tolerate
every act which, in itself, is naturally adapted to promote the
object of the war: Yattel, B. I., ch. 9, § 173; 1 Kent's Comm.,
6th ed., pp. 91, 93, and note; Lawrence's Wheaton, part iv,, ch.
11, § 5, p. 596,
The plaintiff in this action has in his petition supplied a material
averment for the defendant. He says that the property-mules,
wagon, and harness-were taken 1 and used to haul and carry the
guns and ammunition belonging to said band, and used by them
in carrying out and executing their common purpose and intent
aforesaid (war upon the United States)." The property seems
not to have been taken for private gain, but for the purposes of
war, and was naturally adapted to promote that object. It was,
therefore, subject to capture and confiscation as enemies' property
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by the laws of war; and the loss cannot with justice be laid upon
the defendant. It was for the plaintiff, one of the losses incident
to the war; and is damnum absque injuria,a loss for which no
action can be maintained.
I shall, therefore, overrule the motion to strike out.
The foregoing case we have given, as
it is upon a subject of great interest at
the present time to the whole country,
and, to some portions of it, of the utmost
importance. We do not intend to offer
any comments upon it, but refer our
readers to the case of Lucas v. Bruce in
the Louisville Chancery Court, reported
in 4 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.), p. 95,
where views somewhat different will be
found in the opinion of Chancellor
PIRTLE.

We have lately received a number of
cases upon interesting points in law
growing out of the rebellion ; but as
they are for the most part too long to be
given entire, we shall take this opportunity of noticing briefly the most important of them.
I. Ex parteJ. R. McCann, late major
of the so-called Confederat6 army, in the
District Court of the United States for
the district of Tennessee, was an application for a habeas corpus, under the
following circumstances, as set forth iRn
the petition : The petitioner was an officer in the army of the late so-called Confederate States, and, as such, surrendered
and was paroled under the agreement
made between the authorities of the
United States and the commanders of
the armies of the so-called Confederacy,
after mhich he took the oath prescribed
in the amnesty proclamation of the
President of May 29th 1865, but was
subsequently arrested and confined in
jail in Knox county, Tennessee, to answer an indictment in the Circuit Court
of said county, for the murder of one
A. C. Haun, who during the war was
tried by a court-martial of which the
petitioner was a member, and executed

for being a secret active enemy of the
so-called Confederate States, and as
such having engaged in acts not of regular warfare. The petition proceeded
that the war between the United States
and the so-called Confederate States was
a civil war and the parties engaged
therein belligerents, and therefore the
petitioner was quasi a judicial officer in
the act for which he was indicted, and
not responsible therefor. The court
(TRIGG, J.), after expressing an opinion that the late rebellion had assumed
the status of a civil war, quoting the
opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the prize cases, 2
Black's Reports, and that upon the
facts stated in the petition, which, for
the purposes of the present inquiry,
must be taken to be true, the courtmartial of which the petitioner was a
member was a regularly-constituted judicial tribunal, recognised by the law
of nations, and therefore by the laws
of the United States, proceeded as
follows :"1The 14th section of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 provides ' that the courts
of the United States shall have power
to issue writs of scire facias, habeaw,
corpus, and all other writs not specially
provided for by statute which may b
necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable tU
the principles and usages of law. An(A
that either of the justices of the Supreme Court, as well as judges of the
District Courts, shall have power to
grant writs of habeas corpus for tie purpose of an inquiry into the ause of

commitment:

Provided, ths. writs of

habeas corpus shall in no case extend to
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prisoners in jail, unless where they are
in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the
same, or are necessary to be brought
into court to testify.'
"This law is so plain that it cannot
be misapprehended, and it admits of no
comment.
"The petitioner, .according to his own
showing, is a prisoner in jail, upon the
charge of murder preferred against him
by indictment in the state court, and he
is not ' in custody under or by color of
the authority of the United States, or
committed for trial before any court of
the same.'
"I have, therefore, no power or jurisdiction, under the law, to grant the
prayer of the petitioner in this case, and
consequently the writ mustbe denied. See
the cases Ex parteDorr, 7 Howard 104;
Ex parte Cabrera, 1 Wash. C. C. 234.
"The provisions of the Act of Congress passed in 1842, and which were
so earnestly pressed by the counsel, I
am satisfied have no application to this
case, but are applicable alone to subjects
or citizens of a foreign state."
The petition was therefore dismissed.
Ii.In the matter of John Baxter, in
the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Eastern District of Tennessee, the
facts were that one John Baxter had
been an attorney of the court, but the
authority of the United States in that
district having been suspended during
part of the rebellion, he was re-admitted
in May 1864. On the 24th January 1865
an act was passed by Congress declaring
that no person should thereafter be admitted to the bar of the United States
courts or be allowed to be heard by reason of any previous admission, without
having first taken the oath prescribed in
the act of July 2d 1862. The terms of
the oath are as follows: "I do solemnly
swear that I have never voluntarily
borne arms against the United States

since I have been a citizen thereof; that
I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to
persons engaged in armed hostility
thereto; that I have neither sought nor
accepted, nor attempted to exercise the
-functions of any office whatever, under
any authority or pretended authority in
hostility to the United States; that I
have not yielded a voluntary support to
any pretended government, authority,
power, or constitution within the United
States, hostile or inimical thereto. And
I do further swear that, to the best of my
knowledge and ability, I will support
and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same; that I take this
obligation freely, without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God."
On the said Baxter attempting to address the court from the bar, at the present term, he was informed by the court
that he could not be heard until he had
taken the oath above set forth, whereupon he objected that the said law was
unconstitutional, and the court had
therefore no right to compel him to take
the said oath. The matter was subsequently argued by the objector in person,
and T. A. R. Ndson against, and
Horace Maynard in favor of, the constitutionality of the law. The ground
first assumed for the objector was that
the act impairs the obligation of a contract, because an attorney is examined
in Tennessee by the judges of the state
courts and by them licensed to practise,
and therefore to receive fees and emoluments of his profession. Upon this
point the court (TRGG, J.), after noticing the doubt whether Congress has
power to pass an act impairing contracts,
and inclining to think that it has not,
expressed the opinion that tie admission of an attorney was not a contract
within the terms of the Constitution.
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It was further urged that the law was
an ex post facto law, and therefore unconstitutional. Upon this point the court
stated the question to be, whether the
act was to be considered as prescribing
additional qua!lficationsfor office under
the government, or as a criminal enactment inflicting a penalty upon those who
refuse to comply with its terms. The
court then proceeded to show that an
attorney is an officer of the court, but
not of the government, and that, as to
him, the act must be considered as penal.
But an attorney has a right to practise
his profession, and such profession is his
property within the protection of the
Constitution, and the law, therefore,
punishing an attorney by forfeiture of
his property in his profession, for acts
not so punishable when committed, is
ex post facto in its operation as to such
cases, and therefore unconstitutional.
Admitting the correctness of the assumption that his profession is an attorney's
property and the act requiring him to
swear in his own case, the same conclusion as to the unconsanuonality of the
law is reached by reference to the fifth
article of the Amendments, which declares that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." For these reasons,
the court pronounced the law unconstitutional and void.
HI. Filkins v. Hawkins, in the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit of Arkansas, September Term, 1865, was a motion to quash an execution issued on a
judgment of the Circuit Court of Pulaski county, of the September Term,
1864. The ground of the motion was
that the so-called judgment was rendered
by a tribunal under the authority of a
rebellious combination of persons in the
state, and that the said supposed court
was part of the machinery created to aid
in the overthrow of th6 lawful govern-

ment of the state and the United States,
and, as such, its acts were null and void.
The court (BARTLETT, J.), after brief
ly recounting the steps in the rebellion,
from the passage of the Ordinance of
Secession to the restoration of the lawful
authority of the United States, declared
that the judicial department of the insurrection was as much a vital part of it
as the military or legislative, and must
equally fall with the overthrow of the
pretended government. "They were
all parts of one whole, and fell together.
It never had any existence in law. It
was an effort, a criminal, and, as the
result has shown, an abortive effort to
destroy the lawful government by revolution ; and its laws and ordinances, its
judgments and decrees, have no more
force or effect on the citizens of the state
and the United States than the orders
of a rebel general would have on the
officers of the United States now garrisoning this city." The Constitution of
the United States, sec. 2, art. 6, declares
that it and the laws made in pursuance
thereof shall be the supreme law of the
land, and the judges in every state shall
be bound thereby ; and sec. 3 declares
that all executive and judicial officers,
both of the United States and of the
several states, shall be bound by oath to
support the Constitution. This oath
was not only not taken, hut the authority of the Constitution and laws of
the United States was expressly disclaimed by the pretended court rendering this judgment. In answer to the
argument that the court was a court de
facto and hence that its judgment was
binding, BARTLETT, J., citing the Prize
Cases, 2 Black; Luther v. Borden, 7
How. 1 ; Gilson v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246 ;
United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610;
United States v. Reynesi 9 How. 127 ;
and Secretary Seward's despatches to
Minister Adams, said that the rebel
government could not be recognised as
a de facto government. Such recogni.
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tion was the province of the executive
department of the United States, and
that has repeatedly and expressly decided that it would not admit that the
combination of disloyal citizens in insurrection has at any time been a government de facto, or in any sense, a political power.
It was further argued that the socalled judgment was protected by the
new constitution of the state of Arkansan, which ordains that the action of the
convention of 1861 is null and void, and
all the action of the state under the
authority of the said convention, whether
legislative, executive, judicial, or military, was and is thereby declared void;
".Provided, that this ordinance shall not
be so construed as to affect the rights of
individuals," &c. On this point, however, the court said that the rights meant
were such as were acquired as individuals, and by individual action, contract,
or obligation, independent of and without the intervention of the official action
of the pretended government or its officers. For these agencies were all illegal,
their acts void, and no individual could
acquire any rights through them. The
right of plaintiff to sue defendant for his
claim was protected, but it remained as
it was, a mere right to sue. The proviso
in question did not mean to give any
new right, as it would by enforcing this
judgment, The execution therefore was
quashed.
IV. In Jones v. Estate of Keep, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided

Vor. XI-V.-1

that the Act of Congress of July 4th
1864, imposing a stamp duty on judicial
process in state courts, is unconstitutional. The argument of the court, by
COLE, J., is that as a power to tax is a
power to destroy, the power of Congress
under the Constitution is limited to such
subjects as will not interfere with the
internal sovereignty of the several states,
and judicial process is one of the necessary instrumentalities of the state government, and therefore not taxable by
Congress.
This is substantially the
same ground as that assumed by the Supreme Court of Indiana in Warren v.
Paul, 4 Am. Law leg. (N. S.) 157 ; a.
c. 22 Ind. Rep.. 276. In the Wisconsin court Mr. Justice DowNyR dissented,
and held that the tax was not on the
state or its instruments of sovereignty,
but on the individual suitor, in the same
manner as the law of the state of Wisconsin itself, which imposes a similar
tax on its own writs. It is a tax paid
in the first place by the plaintiff, but
ultimately by the losing party-the bne
who is adjudged to have been in the
wrong in causing the lawsuit. Besides
this, however, he was further of opinion
that the Constitution expressly delegates
to Congress the right "to tax directly
or indirectly the persons and property
of the citizens of the states, although
such taxation may incidentally affect the
instrumentalities which a state uses as
a proper means to execute its powers."
J. T, M
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
COCHRAN v. ELDRIDGE.
The courts of Pennsylvania have the powers of the Court of Chancery to relieve
against inequitable judgments.
The usual practice is to open the judgment and let the defendant into a defence
on the merits, and on the trial of the issue, the defendant may show fraud in obtaining the judgment.
The power extends to judgments on awards of arbitrators, notwithstanding tn
statutory remedies in cases of compulsory arbitration.

CERTIFICATE from Nisi Prius.

f'zcIntyre, for plaintiff.
Wollaston and Chapron, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WOODt'ARD, C. J.-It is necessary to a clear apprehension of
the points to be ruled that the material facts of the case be first
stated, and this shall be done as briefly as possible.
James Eldridge, a resident of California since 1854, though at
intervals between that date and 1863 sojourning temporarily in
the cities of New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, was in
Philadelphia in the summer of 1856, when he made two promissory notes, payable to the order of E. S. Townsend, for $3000
each, both dated 19th June 1856, and drawn, one at 30 days, the
other at 60 days.
On the 14th October 1856, Eldridge made his draft at the city
of Washington, in favor of Townsend, for $300.
These three papers, the two notes and the draft, having passed
into the hands of Cochran, he brought suit upon them in 1860
against Eldridge, and obtained a personal service of the process.
A rule of reference was entered and served, and the hearing
before arbitrators was adjourned from time to time from March
1860 to 30th August 1860, when Cochran took an award for
$7834.98, the amount of the notes, draft, and interest. Time
for appealing was extended by consent of counsel for several
periods until December 1860, when the judgment became absolute. In 1862, application was made to my brother Judge READ
at Nisi Prius to open the judgment and let the defendant into his
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defence, and affidavits were exhibited and filed in support of the
motion. His Honor, not satisfied from the evidence before him
that more than $2500 had been advanced upon the notes and
draft, and it appearing to him that very suspicious circumstances
attended the award of arbitrators on which judgment was entered
for the full amount of the face of this paper and interest, ordered
that the judgment be opened and an issue framed to try the following questions:1st. What amount was actually paid or advanced on the securities by the plaintiff, either before or after their maturity, and
to whom?
2d. Was the award of arbitrators obtained by fraud or collusion ?
It was also further ordered that the plaintiff or defendant and
all other persons, whether interested or not, shall be examined as
witnesses by either side.
At a subsequent term of the Nisi Prius, these issues came to trial
before me, and from the conflicting testimony of the parties and their
respective friends, it appeared pretty evident that .Eldridge had
placed the notes in Townsend's hands to sell and forward the proceeds to him (Eldridge) at Washington; that Townsend employed
Cochran as his broker to sell the notes in the market, but that
Cochran failed to find a purchaser ; that Townsend informed
Eldridge that the notes could not be discounted; that Eldridge
instructed Townsend to send the notes to him or destroy them,
and was afterwards informed by Townsend that they were de
stroyed; that he returned to California and first heard of the
notes in the summer of 1"857, and on his return to the East in
August of that year, Cochran informed him that he held the notes
and draft for advances made to Townsend in dealings between
themselves; that he applied to Townsend, who admitted that
Cochran held the paper as security for moneys advanced to him,
but that he (Eldridge) need give himself no further trouble about
the notes, and that he would arrange them with Cochran. Eldridge
swore that Cochran never spoke to him subsequently about the
notes, though he saw him frequently, but that in passing through
Philadelphia in 1860, he was served with process at the suit of
Cochran; that he applied to Townsend, who again assured him that
he would arrange the matter with Cochran, and that he (Eldridge)
need give himself no trouble about the matter, and when he heard
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subsequently of the reference, he was informed and believed it
had for its object the settlement of accounts between Cochran and
Townsend which would release his paper. Townsend employed
counsel to appear for Eldridge, but never furnished them with any
means of defence.
Eldridge denied that he ever employed
counsel.
Eldridge swore that he owed Townsend nothing, though he
admitted dealings which resulted in a balance against Townsend
of some $30,000. Townsend, on the other hand, swore that
Eldridge owed him money, and that he owed Eldridge nothing.
Cochran claimed to be the creditor of Townsend to a large
amount, and that he had bought these notes of him on account
of his indebtedness. Townsend, on the other hand, represented
himself to have had large transactions with Cochran and his son,
but that he had received only some $2500 on account of these
notes, and he intended, on final settlement, to repay Cochran his
advances, and take up the notes. Cochran swore that he advanced
Townsend some $4000 on the notes; that he paid him for the
draft, and that after the notes matured he bought them of Townsend for the money advanced.
The first issue ordered by Judge READ was evidently founded
on the assumption that Cochran held the notes only as security
for moneys advanced to Townsend, and although I felt myself restrained to the issues upon the record and held that the judgment
was opened no farther than to try them, yet I submitted to the jury
the question whether Cochran were a bond fide purchaser for
value, because it seemed to me that whilst that question was not
raised upon the record, it would, if found in Cochran's favor,
displace both the questions that were raised. The jury were fully
instructed that if he were such holder, it was no matter at what
sum he purchased the paper, and there was no fraud in taking
judgment for the full amount of it.
But if, as the first issue assumel, he held the paper only as his
security for advances, it would be necessary to fix the amount
of those advances ; and on this point all the evidence was referred
to the jury.
Then as to the question of fraud, the jury were instructed that
if Cochran, well knowing that he had advanced less than half the
face of the notes, and that he held them merely as security for
his advances, went before arbitrators, and, in the absence of
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the defendant and his counsel, took an award for the full amount
of the notes and interest, it was evidence from which they might
infer the fraudulent intent.
The jury found that the notes and draft were deposited with
Cochran by E. S. Townsend to be sold for the benefit of Eldridge;
that they were not sold, but that Cochran advanced and paid
Townsend $2300 on the faith and credit of said securities.
They found, also, that the award for $7834.98 was fraudulent
and collusive.
No judgment was entered upon the verdict, but the prothonotary was ordered to enter judgment for Cochran for the amount
of the verdict, not in the issues tried, but in the case of Cochran
v. B dridge, where the judgment was opened; the usual costs to
be taxed on that record for the plaintiff, except the costs of the
arbitration, which Cochran was ordered to pay.
Such was the disposition made of the case at Nisi Prins.
On appeal to this court, the principal points of assault were the
orders of Judge RAD in opening the judgment, and the submission of the question of fraud on the trial of the issues. It was
stoutly denied that the judge had power' to open a judgment
obtained, in an adversary proceeding after service of process,
even for fraud, but if it should be held that he had, it was next
denied that there was any evidence of fraudulent intent or practice to justify either the opening of the judgment or the submission of the question to a jury.
The power to relieve against judgments at law, when fraudulently obtained or where some strong natural equity can be alleged
against them, has been long recognised in English jurisprudence,
and by many writers has been likened to that of the Roman Prietor, whose jurisdiction undoubtedly had its origin in the application of equity as contradistinguished from mere law. It was one
of the first subjects that engaged the attention of the English
chancellors, and, though violently resisted by common-law lawyers and judges, the power was largely exercised by Cardinal
Wolsey in the reign of Henry VIIT, and, according to Mr. Reeves,
with great ability and justice. It is related of Sir Thomas More,
who succeeded Cardinal Wolsey, that, having invited the judges
to dine with him, he showed them the number and nature of the
causes in which he had granted injunctions to judgments of the
courts of common law; and the judges, upon full debate of the
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matters, confessed that they could have done no otherwise them.
selves. Still, however, clamors against the equity jurisdiction
continued, until they culminated in the famous controversy in the
reign of James I., which was conducted principally by Lord COKE
against, and by Lord ELLESMERE in favor of, the chancery juris
-diction. The very point of this controversy, according to Judge
STORY (1 Story's Equity, § 51), was whether a court of equity
could give relief for or against a judgment at common law, and
.it was finally decided in favor of the equity jurisdiction. From
that time down to this day the jurisdiction has been exercised in
England, and decrees of ecclesiastical courts have often been
relieved against on the ground of fraud: Van Brough v. Cock, 1
Chancery Cases 201; Bissel v. Axtell, 2 Vernon 47. And so
in like manner have awards (Lord Lonsdale v. Littledale, 2 Ves.
451) and verdicts (Williams v. Lee, 3 Atk. 223; Bateman v. Willoe, 1 Scho. & Lef. 201Y and judgments at law (Barnsley v. Powell, 1 Ves. Sen. 119 ; Gansboroughv. Gifford, 2 P. Wms. 424;
Humphreys v. Bumphreys, 3 P. Wms. 394). And even decrees
in chancery may be avoided for the same cause: Loyd v. Hansell, 2 P. Wms. 73; Galley v. Baker, Cases Temp. Talbot 201;
Bradish v. Gee, Amb. 229. In the above-cited case from 2 P.
Wms., at page 246, the Master of the Rolls said such cases there
are in which equity will relieve after a verdict in a matter where
the defendant at law might properly have defended himself, as if
plaintiff recovers a debt and defendant finds a receipt for the
money recovered. In .fumphreys v. Hfumphreys, 3 P. Wms.
394, a son had sued his father at law on a bond, and recovered
a judgment, agairlt which an injunction was granted in chancery.
I do not think it necessary to encumber the page with a citation
of the more modern English decisions. For American authorities
I refer to Piekett v. Steward, 1 Rand. 478, where an executor
was relieved from a judgment recovered against him; Skipwith
v. Struther, 3 Rand. 214; and Gill v. Webb's Admr., 4 Monro
299, where it was held that a court of equity has jurisdiction to
relieve against a judgment founded on a gaming debt, although
the party failed to defend himself at law and gave no good reason for such failure. Relief will be granted in equity on the
ground of concealment of material facts by a party, in consequence of which he recovered at law: Fish v. Lane, 2 Hayw.
342. In accordance with this principle, Chief Justice MAR HALL
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saids m Sims v. S7ocum, 8 Cranch 307, when the person who has
committed the fraud attempts to avail himself of the act, so as to
discharge himself from a previously existing obligation, or to
acquire a benefit, the judgment thus obtained is declared void as
to that purpose. See also .eigel v. Wood, 1 Johns. Ch. Rep
402 ; Shattenkirk v. W-heeler, 3 Johns. Ch. Rep. 275 ; De Reimer
v. De Cantillon, 4 Id. 85; Van Meeter v. Jones, 2 Green's (N.
J.) Ch. Rep. 520.
Whether the principles of these cases be applied by courts of
chancery as an independent jurisdiction or by courts of law exercising equity powers, is a matter of no significance. The material
point is that such principles do pervade our jurisprudence, and it
is well they do, for they are only the dictates of natural justice
and common sense. That wholesome maxim of the common law,
that fraud vitiates whatever it touches, makes no exception of
judgments at law. No court of justice will set aside or even be
led to look into a solemn judgment on light or trivial grounds ;
but when it is alleged upon adequate proofs that a judgment in
whole or in part has been obtained by a suppression of truth which
it was the duty of the party to disclose or by the suggestion of a
falsehood or by any of the infinite and therefore undefinable means
by which fraud may be practised, no court will allow itself, its
records, and the process of law to be used as instruments of fraud.
It seemed to be thought, on the argument, that the judgment in
this case, being founded upon an award of arbitrators, could be impeached only by proceeding under the Acts of Assembly regu.
lating compulsory arbitrations, but the principle lies deeper than
the form of the proceedings; it goes to the very root of the evil
when it deprives him of all benefit of his iniquity who has fraudulently employed legal process and judicial records to obtain an
undue advantage over another.
Opening judgments entered upon warrant of attorney, and by
confession, has been largely practised in Pennsylvania. Sometimes a collateral issue has been directed to try disputed facts,
sometimes -execution-process has been controlled to promote the
equity due to parties, but our favorite practice, and that which
Ch. J. GIBSON commended in Gallup v. Beynoids, 8 Watts 425,
has been to open the judgment without impairing its lien, and let
the defendant in to defend upon the matters alleged in his affidavit
of complaint. Our practice, said the Chief Justice in that case
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is to try collusion by a collateral issue, but matter of defence 1y
an issue in the cause. In Kellogg v. Krauser,14 S. & R. 148,
Oh. J. TILGHmAN declared in 1826, that the practice of opening
judgments entered on warrant of attorney, or of ordering a feigned
issue, to ascertain necessary facts, had been undisputed for half a
century, at least. In Ealbach v. Fisher,1 Rawle 328, a judgment
had bean entered in the Common Pleas of Berks county in
1820, upon warrant of attorney; a scire facias to revive it
and judgment thereon in 1825 ; and in 1827 a rule was obtained
to open both the original judgment and that upon the seire
facias, which was made absolute, and a trial had in 1828,
which resulted in a verdict for the defendant. In delivering the
opinion of the Supreme Court, that no writ of error would lie to
the opening of a judgment by the court below, Mr. Justice ROGERS
said: "The power of the Court of Common Pleas, in relation to
opening judgments, is most ample, and policy requires that it should
be liberally used, otherwise great and manifest injustice would be
the consequence, from the great variety of shapes which fraud
may assume in the complicated transactions of men. It depends
upon the sound discretion of the court, which must be regulated
more by the particular circumstances of every case, than by any
precise and known rule of law. In Huston v. Mitchell, 14 S. &
R. 807, it was ruled, that the Court of Common Pleas had no
right to set aside a judgment entered upon a verdict without setting aside the verdict also. See also -Dickerson'sAPoeal, 7 Barr
257; Banning v. Taylor, 12 Harris 291; Stiles v. Bradford, 4
Rawle 401.
In most of these cases it will be seen that, whilst the power of
opening judgments to let defendants in upon the merits has been
vindicated, it has been assumed that either in that form, or by
framing a collateral issue, fraud in obtaining the judgment may
be shown; and if shown that it will kill the judgment. Creditors
have often been admitted, to show that a judgment was fraudulent
as between the original parties, and it would be strange if the
defrauded party might not show the fraud.
The doubt expressed in Mather's Executors v. Patterson, 9
Casey 487, not whether a court has power to overhaul a judgment for fraud, but whether the report of the auditors in that case
was properly remitted to them after a final judgment, has no
reference to the subject under consideration. Nor have the
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observations that were made in Catlin v. Bobinson, 2 Watts 879,
and in Stephens v. Cowan, 6 Id. 513. Doubtless, the discretion
of the court in listening to a plea of fraud will be influenced by
the lapse of time, and a chance once had, though not improved,
for a fair trial; but both of these considerations were overlooked
in tae above-cited case of Kalach v. Fisher, and would be
again if necessary to correct a palpable fraud.
These authorities are sufficient to show that our courts have
always possessed, and in one form or another exercised the chancery
power of relieving against fraudulent judgments, however obtained,
and that Judge READ did not transcend his just powers when he
opened the judgment and framed the issues in this case. On the
question whether the evidence justified the finding of the fraud,
we had so much doubt as to stimulate us to a caieful considerttion of the testimony, and the result (f our reflections is that the
question was properly submitted.
That Mr. Eldridge was badly cheated by his agent Townsend
seems to us quite probable, but we see no satisfactory evidence
that Cochran was in combination with Townsend to cheat Eldridge.
Still, however, Cochran knew how he held the paper of Eldridge,
and, as the fact is now established by the verdict, that he held it
only as a security for his advances to Townsend, Cddhran must be
considered as knowing that he was entitled to receive on that
paper no more than these advances. We cannot treat him aS a
bond fide purchaser of the paper, for the jury found that he was
not. Then he was a iere pledgee, and he must :have known himself to be nothing more. It was argued that he would be responsible to Townsend for the full amount of the paper, and therefore

was bound

to

demand the full amount from Eldridge.

But he

cohld, in no event, have been liable to Townsend, for Townsend
never owned the paper, nor had any interest in it. All parties
proved that it was placed in Cochran's hands to be sold for Eldridge's use, and was not sold, but was retained by Cochran as
security for his advances to Townsend. Now the inference is
large enough that Cochran made these advances to Townsend in
good faith and upon the credit of this paper, without pressing it
so far as to make it an ordinary business transaction in which
Cochran would stand as a purchaser of the paper from Townsend.
Had he been such a purchaser, there would have been a reason
for his taking an award for the full sum of the paper, for there
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might have been a liability over to Townsend; or, if none, it
would have been because he had extinguished Townsend's interest
and held the paper as his own, and, of course, for all it expressed.
But Townsend had no interest in the paper, and could call Cochran to no account by reason of it. The paper was made by El
dridge for his own use, and having permitted Cochran to make
advances on the faith of it, he is bound to reimburse him, though
no dollar of Cochran's advances ever reached his hands; but
beyond this he was under no duty to Cochran, and Cochran knew
that this was the extent of his liability.
Cochran knew also that Eldridge was absent in California, that
he had repudiated this paper altogether, and that Townsend and
not Eldridge was attending to the arbitration. He was probably
aware of the fact also that Townsend had led Eldridge to believe
that the object of the arbitration was to settle the dealings between
themselves, Cochran and Townsend, and he certainly knew that
Townsend was managing the arbitration, for he received a consideration from him for adjournments and extensions of the right of
appeal.
Now, under these circumstances, to demand and take an award
against Eldridge for $7834.98, when the jury could not find that
he had advanced more than $2300, was, in their judgment, ill
faith and fraudulent. The verdict does exact justice to Cochran,
supposing him a pledgee and not a bond fide purchaser of the
paper, for it compels Eldridge to repay every dollar his agent
received from Cochran on the credit of the paper he issued, but
it prevents his using legal process, the award and judgment, to
inflict the great wrong upon Eldridge of making him pay nearly
six thousand dollars which he never received and which Cochran
never advanced. We think there was enough in the case to justify
the submission, and as substantial justice was obtained we will
affirm the judgment and proceedings.
Proceedings affirmed.

